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Abstract  
Ubiquitous information systems (UBIS) adapt current Information System thinking to 
explicitly differentiate technology between hardware devices and software components. An 
unfolding vision of vast numbers of computing devices becoming a pervasive part of our 
everyday lives in underway as more routine activities move into the realm of information and 
communication technology (ICT). Customer loyalty smart card tracking, mobile and smart 
phone application, wireless MP3 players, intelligent key cards, close circuit television 
cameras, motion sensors, electronic passports and RFID cards are some of the frequently 
used ubiquitous devices that handle personal information about their owners and of which a 
typical average consumer could own more than one of them. This research paper investigates 
personal privacy issues confronting ubiquitous system users with the aim of constructing a 
framework that can help designers of such systems to better protect the personal privacy of 
the users of these systems through the integration of certain design concepts suggested by the 
framework into their design processes. Ten selected users of ubiquitous devices were 
interviewed, focusing on issue around the misunderstanding of some personal privacy 
concepts relating to their ubiquitous devices and locations of use. Interview responses were 
transcribed into electronic format and analyzed using grounded theory analysis and micro-
coding techniques. The grounded theory analysis led to the identification of five concepts: 
Scope of potential disclosure of information, Scope of actual disclosure of information, 
Complexity of configuration, Top level control mechanism and integration of existing 
practices. 
 
Keywords: Ubiquitous/Pervasive Computing, Privacy, Grounded Theory 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
Mark Weiser (1991) described the term ubiquitous computing as the seamless 
interaction between various computer systems and people without restrictions on 
location or time. The field of ubiquitous computing envisages an era when the typical 
consumer owns hundreds or thousands of mobile and embedded computing devices 
(Weiser, 2001). These devices will perform actions based on the context of their 
users, and therefore ubiquitous systems will gather, collate and distribute much more 
personal information about individuals than computers do today (Beresford, 2005). 
 Each day, every one of us leaves some individually identifiable information behind 
(as recently highlighted by Channel 4 news in the UK 2009). All the information that 
is sent and received via mobile phones, Web browsers and other ubiquitous devices 
are traceable, in such a way that credit or customer loyalty card use leaves residual 
information about what is consumed by the card owner.  
 
It is generally recognised that the use of ubiquitous computers, networks and 
intelligent sensors make it possible to record consumers behaviour in more detail. 
Coupled with the use of sophisticated analysis techniques and their adoption in sectors 
with sensitive data raise privacy concerns and poses a threat on the safety of the 
information such as shopping history, internet sites browsed, current location of 
device etc. collected by these systems.  In relation to the first trend, it is important that 
users are aware of the nature and privacy implications of information they are 
disclosing when interacting with ubiquitous devices. In order for users to understand 
these privacy implications it is necessary that designers of these ubiquitous devices 
and applications endeavour to provide effective privacy protection frameworks within 
the ubiquitous systems, one that is able to support the intended user straightforward 
and meaningful way. 
 
Despite many concerns with these ubiquitous issues, there have been little analytical 
or systematic attempts to enable understanding of the relationship between privacy 
and the ubiquitous technology. It is obvious that users try to note whenever this 
system introduces ‘privacy issues’, but with the present lack of analytical tools, users 
are unable to understand what exactly these issues are (Palen and Dourish, 2003).  
This research hopes to provide designers of ubiquitous systems a better understanding 
of what ‘Privacy’ means in relation to the users of the ubiquitous devices and further 
present recommendations aimed at forming a meaningful privacy protection 
framework that can be applied during the ubiquitous systems/application design 
process. This study presents a preliminary investigation into personal privacy issues 
concerning ubiquitous technology users, their view on privacy and then concludes 
with suggestions for possible ways of extending the research for further works. 
 
This paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 covers some of the characteristics of 
privacy in general and with respect to ubiquitous systems.  Section 3 covers the 
 
 interview design and Section 4 presents the grounded theory research method 
deployed in this research and the data collection mechanisms.  Section 5 discusses this 
early research and identifies a number of possible avenues for helping the designer to 
better support the privacy concerns of the user.  
 
2.0 Privacy in Ubiquitous Systems 
2.1 Privacy 
The importance of privacy in the conduct of human affairs is rightly significant and is 
agreed upon by researchers of various disciplines (Grabner-Kräuter and Kaluscha, 
2003). However agreement on a suitable definition of the concept is still lacking 
(Hosmer, 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998; Husted, 1998; Michael, 1994). In the 1890s, 
future United States Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis articulated a concept of 
privacy that urged that it was the individual's “right to be left alone” (Warren and 
Brandeis, 1890).  According to Bloustein (1964) privacy protects the inviolate 
personality, independence and an individual's dignity, highlighting the importance of 
ensuring maximum privacy protection for user’s of ubiquitous devices since most 
ubiquitous devices handles very sensitive information (typically schedules, movement 
and even payment) which could be used in an unwanted way to uncover details about 
a users activity. The Calcutt Committee (1990) said that, nowhere had they found a 
wholly satisfactory statutory definition of privacy, though were satisfied to implement 
the following definition legally: “privacy is the right of the individual to be protected 
against intrusion into his personal life or affairs, or those of his family, by direct 
physical means or by publication of information”.  
 
The debate on privacy has been a major issue as early as the 19th century, when 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis (1890, p.193 – 220) wrote a paper titled “The 
Right to Privacy” which comprehensively explains and analyzes the various rights of 
users to the protection of their privacy, which was largely motivated by the advent of 
modern photography and the printing press. Many people nowadays think of privacy 
more as “the right to select what personal information about me is known to what 
people” (Westin, 1967). Researchers Goecks and Mynatt (2002) emphasized that 
privacy is a vital social issue confronting ubiquitous computing and the emerging 
ubiquitous society today because ubiquitous computing promises a world where 
 
 computational artifacts embedded in the environment will continuously sense our 
activities and provide services based on what is sensed (Weiser, 1991). However, such 
a world presents significant privacy dilemmas (Bellotti and Sellen, 1993; 
Langheinrich, 2001); for instance, these embedded (ubiquitous) artifacts may collect 
personal data about users (such as their location, contact details etc.) and transmit this 
without the user’s intentional consent. 
 
One of the most common examples of a ubiquitous device is the mobile phone. 
Taking off in Europe by mid 1990’s, the mobile phone has been universally seen as 
intruding on the individual’s control over time and space as well as redefining public 
and private time and space (Christian and Jean-Philippe, 2002; R. Ling, 2004;Leysia 
and Paul, 2003).  With the mobile phone, the risk of data getting into the wrong hands 
is quite high as it possesses simple security mechanism which the users are sometimes 
ignorant about and privacy frameworks that does not fully explains the implications of 
the decisions made when operating it. This, among other issues, constitutes a serious 
privacy risk for users of the ubiquitous systems. 
  
2.2 Privacy Characteristics 
Researchers have looked at the interactional, process nature of privacy in human 
communications and how it should be supported by technology (Palen and Dourish, 
2003; Warren and Brandeis 1890).  Various approaches which look at privacy from 
different perspectives were proposed by these researchers, which could be synthesized 
into the following categories:  
 Individual-to-State (the information a government has about her citizens) 
 Individual-to-Organizations (what we disclose to different organizations and 
what we get in return) 
 Public (what anybody may know about someone) 
 Groups (how we present ourselves to different reference groups). 
Since this research is built around the concept of personal privacy it is more focused 
on privacy related to groups and Individual-to-Organizations, with some linkages to 
that of the public sectors. 
 
 
 2.3 Ubicomp Privacy 
Ubiquitous Computing promises a world where computational artifacts embedded in 
the environment will continuously sense our activities and provide services based on 
what is sensed (Weiser, 1991). However, such a world presents significant privacy 
dilemmas (Bellotti and Sellen, 1993; Langheinrich, 2001); if not addressed, Goecks 
and Mynatt (2002) suggested these dilemmas have the potential to turn the vision of 
ubiquitous computing into a world where “Big Brother” is always watching us and 
personal privacy is near nonexistent. Alan (1967) highlighted that one of the most 
important aspects of privacy protection is the control of personal information. The 
goal of personal privacy protection is to empower users with authority over data 
collected from them by any (ubiquitous) system.  
 
Personal information may take on many forms in the ubiquitous environment. For 
example, Harrison et al.(1993) illustrated this in media spaces which use audio and 
video recording devices to capture and share what a user says or is doing. Similarly, 
Futakawa et al.(1999) explained that some mobile ubiquitous applications are capable 
of identifying and sharing a user’s location thereby exposing its user to serious 
privacy risk, should such information fall into the wrong hands. In order to achieve 
the ultimate vision of the ubiquitous computing world, it is paramount that designers 
of ubiquitous systems employ a privacy framework when developing and deploying 
into ubiquitous devices, applications and environments in order to protect the privacy 
of the users and gain their trust at some level.  A preliminary study is undertaken in 
order to explore the concerns of user in this arena. 
 
 
3.0 Research Approach 
3.1 Interviews 
Interview questions were derived from the issues identified from the outcomes of the 
literature review, it focuses on addressing user’s misunderstanding on the issues of 
personal privacy concerned with the usage of (their) ubiquitous devices; the research 
adopted an interview development framework which was previously suggested by 
Moore (2000). The process was carried out in four stages: a) Purpose of interview 
 
 established, b) Subject areas to be covered outlined, c) Key interviewees determined 
and d) the Interview approach identified.  
3.2 Interview purpose established  
 
The purpose of the interview was to discover the user’s appreciation of security when 
interacting with ubiquitous devices. Identification of the privacy gaps in relation to the 
ubiquitous systems with the ultimate objective of uncovering privacy issues, causes of 
the issue and possible solutions to the issue; as such the following areas are to be 
addressed by the interview: 
 Identify the factors that affect actions taken by users of ubiquitous systems 
when operating the device 
 Identify various protective measures that ubiquitous device users initiate to 
enable the protection of their privacy 
 Identify how the users are expecting the system to function  
 
In achieving its objectives, the interview was divided into two parts the first part seeks 
understand the interviewee characteristics (such as gender, age group, level of 
involvement in ubiquitous system usage est.) of the interviewee. The second part of 
the interview will examine the theoretical areas of vulnerability proposed in the 
literature review, the analysis of which will assist in the identification of generalized 
planning and contingency steps. 
 
3.3 Areas of interest  
 
The interview aims to cover various ubiquitous devices based on some general 
characteristics of ubiquitous systems, these characteristics being: 1) Availability of 
user interface (Visual and Non-Visual), 2) Mobility and 3) Context awareness. With a 
diversified selection, it is more likely to uncover specific issues and direct associated 
solutions. Alternatively, a more specific approach with limited responses about a 
single ubiquitous device would not provide an opportunity to examine the expansive 
nature of privacy in this area. Three ubiquitous devices: 1) Mobile phones (Ubiquitous 
device with UI and mobile), 2) Oyster cards (Ubiquitous devices without UI, but 
mobile) and 3) Ambient displays for example intelligent advertisement billboard 
(ubiquitous device that is static, but affected by contextual surroundings). 
 
 
 3.4 Interviewees and Approach 
 
Since these preliminary interviews focus on identifying user opinions on privacy 
affecting ubiquitous systems, an ideal participant for this interview will be someone 
who is familiar with the usage of an ubiquitous system such as mobile phones, oyster 
cards or personal computer; these are the most common example of ubiquitous 
systems that exhibits characteristics (such as the availability of a visual user interface) 
that are of interest to the purpose of the research. It is important that the people 
selected for the interview already posses some experience and have the relevant 
knowledge on ubiquitous systems operation in order that the data provided would 
have the required depth.  The participants also span through various genders, 
professions and age groups, this was intentionally done to help the research in 
achieving a diversified set of responses. 
 
Data was captured during the interview using note-taking and audio-recording 
equipment; the latter subject to the interviewee’s permission some of the participants 
in the interview were university students, IT professionals, medical workers and other 
unskilled professions (detailed analysis of participants is found in the next section on 
data presentation). On approaching a potential participant, there is a brief verbal 
introduction, and then the research information sheet was first handed to the 
participant to read through, although some of the participants requested the 
information sheet be read out to them and this was willingly done by the researcher. 
Once the participants agrees to continue with the interview the consent form was 
given to them to tick as appropriate and sign, after this the interview questioning 
started.   
 
Prior to conducting the interviews a pilot interview took place to allow for 
adjustments and changes to be made to the interview structure, questions and format 
before the actual interviews take place.  
 
3.4 Interview summary 
 
It would be beneficial to quickly present a breakdown of the audience that participated 
in this research in order to relate the various demographics of the participants to the 
 
 outcome of the research. There were a total of ten interviewees for this research and 
the constituents of the audience are as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to have a clearer understanding of the content of the interview and how it 
relates to the actual purpose intended, a brief segmentation of the interview questions 
and their relationship to the research subject is presented in the following table: 
 
Areas covered Questions 
Background 1) Age 
2) Gender 
3) Make and model of mobile phone 
4) Do you use an oyster card or club card? 
 
Ubiquitous 
device usage 
profile 
5) Please select activities you carry out using your mobile phone 
 Mobile Internet 
 SMS 
 Keypad lock 
 Alarm / Scheduler 
 Address book 
 Bluetooth 
 Music player 
 Email 
 Instant messaging 
 Alert profiles 
 
6) Which of the following activities that you carry out on your computer can 
you also perform on your     mobile phone? 
 Checking email 
 Apple ITunes shopping 
 Amazon/Ebay shopping 
 Watching videos 
 Social networking 
 News websites 
 Using other web services 
 
Perceptions to 
privacy on 
7) How do you protect your personal information (such as contacts, text 
messages and pictures if applicable) from being accessed by people you do not 
Age Group Participants 
18 – 24 6 
25 – 35 2 
36-  45 1 
Over 45 1 
Table 1b: Age groups of participants 
Gender Participants 
Male 6 
Female 4 
Table 1a: Gender of participants 
 
 ubiquitous 
device 
want to show? 
 
8) Do you make payments using your credit card/debit card through the mobile 
phone? 
    Why? What are the factors the influences your decision? 
 
9) Do you protect your voicemail with a password or PIN no?  
    Why? What are the factors the influences your decision? 
 
10) What action do you take when you do not wish to receive mobile phone 
calls? 
      Why? What are the factors the influences your decision? 
 
11) Did you register your oyster card/shopping club cards with your correct 
personal information? 
      Why/Why not? 
 
12)  How often do you check your journey details/shopping activities on your 
oyster/shopping club cards? 
       What are the reasons for this? 
Perception to 
privacy in 
ubiquitous 
location 
13) Would you be comfortable viewing your email, dairy on large display 
screens in a public place? 
      Why/Why not?  
Table 2: Interview Structure 
 
4. Data Analysis – Grounded Theory 
A qualitative data analysis methodology was used for this research - grounded theory. 
This framework was chosen because of the open nature of the research (with no initial 
hypothesis), its applicability to the data being collected and its popularity in 
qualitative research (Bryman and Bell, 2007). Grounded theory provides a framework 
allowing the researcher to systematically categorize transcribed qualitative data, using 
a coding system that allows for identification of themes within the data (Easterby-
smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2008). Traditional research designs usually rely on a 
literature review leading to the formation of a hypothesis. This hypothesis is then put 
to the test by experimentation in the real world. On the other hand, grounded theory 
investigates the actualities in the real world and analyses the data with no 
preconceived hypothesis (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
 
 
 
 4.1 Grounded Theory Analysis Process  
 
For the purpose of clarity, a brief overview of the tasks carried out from data 
collection to analysis of research data using grounded theory is provided (Table 3): 
 
Task Task details 
 
Data Collection Record the interview with each participant. 
 
Transcription Transcribe each completed interview into electronic format 
(Using Microsoft word) in preparation for analysis  
 
Creation of Nvivo project Create new Nvivo project and import the transcribed documents 
into the new project in Nvivo 
 
Analysis in Nvivo All imported documents where opened in Nvivo, Codes and 
concepts where identified using the micro-coding technique of 
the grounded theory (See Figure 1 below). 
 
Coding Where a code appears more than once it is added to the already 
existing node and this increases the “References” to that node 
(represented as frequency during presentation) and similar 
codes where groups together into a new concept. 
 
Categorization Concepts with similar top-level attributes were classified into 
same category, thus identification of categories. 
 
Summary and result export Summary of the results was exported back to a tabular format in 
Microsoft word (See table 4.2) 
 
 
Table 3: Research Steps 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1: Screenshot showing the process of coding Nvivo 
 
When analyzing the interview data, each of the completed interviews were first 
recorded then transcribed into electronic format using Microsoft word 2007 because 
this format made it easier to work flexibly with the actual interview data during the 
actual analysis process. The electronic transcripts were then put through a coding 
process, this involved the identification, breakdown, and comparison of key concepts 
common in the interview data collected until clearly defined patterns are formed 
which gives an insight into understanding the research question (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998), to assist with the coding and analysis the use of a computer aided qualitative 
data analysis software tool (CAQDAS) called NVivo was adopted.  
 
NVivo assists in speeding up the often cumbersome task associated with coding and 
retrieving large amounts of data by providing a global view of the transcribed 
documents making it easy to go back and forth within the transcripts. The coding was 
done using the micro-analysis coding method of the grounded theory; meaning each 
interview response in the transcript was critically scrutinized such that more than one 
 
  
code could emerge from the same data (Allan, 2003). A concept map relating the 
identified concepts to the raw data collected from the interview was created in order 
to demonstrate the relationship of the analysis output to the raw data collected from 
the interviews, this would also give a sense of wholesome understanding about the 
how the codes were created and how it relates to the various research areas.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: A Concept map that links discovered concepts to the interview responses
5.0  Discussion 
The research presented in this paper is still at an early stage.  The five concerns 
identified can be classified under two major categories which are those that primarily 
affect users’ understanding of a system’s privacy implications and those that primarily 
affect their ability to conduct meaningful action through the system. 
 
Understanding 
 
Action 
Scope of potential disclosure of 
information 
 
Top level control mechanism  
Scope of actual disclosure of 
information 
 
Complexity of configuration 
 Integration of existing practice 
 
Table 3: Privacy Concerns 
 
Each concern is now detailed, with suggestions of how designers of ubiquitous 
systems could overcome them with examples of applications in real life. 
 
 
5.1 Concern DI: Scope of Potential Disclosure of Information 
Users might sometimes have difficulty appropriating a system into their privacy 
practice if the scope of its privacy implications is not explicitly clear. This scope 
includes the types of information the system conveys, the kinds of observers it 
conveys to, the media through which it is conveyed, the length of retention, the 
potential for unintentional disclosure, the presence of third-party observers, and the 
collection of Meta information.  Clarifying a system’s potential for conveying 
personal information is vital to users’ ability to predict the social consequences of its 
use. Among the conveyable information types are identifiable personae (e.g., true 
names, login names, email addresses, credit card numbers) and monitorable activities 
(broadly, any of the user’s interpretable actions and/or the contexts in which they are 
performed, e.g., locations, purchases, social relations, correspondences, audio/video 
records). Boyd (2002) revealed that this dichotomy of personae and activities, though 
imperfect and coarse, can be useful shorthand for conceptualizing a user’s identity 
space, with personae serving as indices to dynamically intersecting subspaces and 
activities serving as the contents of those subspaces. 
 5.1.1 Research Evidence: Scope of Potential Disclosure of Information 
 v 
One of the easiest ways that ubiquitous system designers obscure a system’s privacy 
scope is by presenting certain functions ambiguously. An obvious example of this 
flaw is the power off button available on most mobile phone devices. Sometimes 
when mobile phone users want to switch their mobile phone off they simply apply the 
“power off” button in anticipation of completely powering down the entire device. 
The field study revealed that about 70% of ubiquitous device users switch off their 
devices in anticipation of avoiding alerts and disturbances (7 out of the 10 respondents 
to the interview demonstrated this in their responses). This is evident in one of the 
responses by the users quoted below: 
 
“Ordinarily,  I  do  not  entertain  unpleasant  noise  as  such my  phone  is  always  on 
vibration, when  I am  in meetings  I  turn  it off and get  the voicemails afterwards” 
(Appendix 10, Question 10b) 
 
However completely switching off a mobile phone from the power button might not 
completely disable the device in some situations, as certain utilities such as the alarm 
and scheduler still continue to run even when the phone is powered down.  If an alarm 
had been previously set on the mobile device, at the scheduled time the alarm would 
still go off and could create some unsolicited alert and possibly pass a lot of 
information about the user (such as been at an appointment at the time the alarm went 
off) to the people around; this is totally unintended as the mobile phone user would 
have assume to have completely turned off the device.  
 
A similar example of this flaw was illustrated in Beckwith’s (2003) report of an 
eldercare facility that uses worn transponder badges to monitor the locations of 
residents and staff (Beckwith, 2003). Many residents perceived the badge only as a 
call-button (which it was) but not as a persistent location tracker (which it also was). 
They did not understand the disclosures it was capable of facilitating. In another 
similar piece of research by Reang, he reveals that some hospitals use badges to track 
the location of nurses for efficiency and accountability purposes but neglect to clarify 
what kind of information the system conveys. Erroneously thinking the device was 
also a microphone, one concerned nurse wrote, “They've placed it in the nurses' 
 
 lounge and kitchen. Somebody can click it on and listen to the conversation. You 
don't need a Big Brother overlooking your shoulder” (Reang, 2002). 
 
5.1.2 Proposed Solution: Scope of Potential Disclosure of Information 
 
Ubiquitous systems should provide clear indications of the scope and limitations of 
actions carried out on the system, for instance providing an easy option for user to 
completely “power down” their mobile phones including all applications (such as 
alarm and scheduler) while switching off their phones will help them realize how their 
actions has actually affected the potential scope of information flow on the mobile 
phone. More so, many web sites that require an email address for creating an account 
should give clear notice on their sign-up forms that they do not share email addresses 
with third parties or use them for extraneous communication with the user. Clear, 
concise statements like these help clarify scope, and they are becoming more 
common, as well as being demanded by law in certain circumstances by the 
information commissioner’s office (http://www.ico.gov.uk, 2009). 
 
5.2 Concern AD: Scope of Actual Disclosure of Information 
 
Having highlighted the user’s need to understand a system’s potential privacy 
implications, the next level is the instances of actual disclosure of personal 
information. To whatever degree is reasonable, designers should make clear the actual 
disclosure of information through the system. Users should understand which of their 
information is being conveyed to whom and for what purpose. The disclosure should 
be obvious to the user as it occurs; if this is impractical, notice should be provided 
within a reasonable delay. Feedback should sufficiently inform but not overwhelm the 
user. This can help users understand the consequences of their use of the system thus 
far and predict the consequences of future use.  
 
5.2.1 Research Evidence: Scope of Actual Disclosure of Information 
 
During the interviews, some of the participants indicated their willingness to divulge 
their financial information over phone only if the company has a reputable public 
 
 image and accept payment over the phone, an interviewee response is quoted as 
follows: 
“Once the company do accept cards over the phone I always like to pay using that 
medium and if something goes wrong my bank insurance will settle for it”  
 
Around 50% of ubiquitous device users who showed their willingness to divulge their 
financial information vocally over their mobile devices (5 out of the 10 respondents to 
the interview demonstrated this in their responses). Although the motive of payment 
itself might be justified however; it is at sometimes done without the consideration of 
those who are around the user that may be acquire the information being conversed 
thereby compromising the information being transferred. In another similar work, 
Felten et. al (2001) illustrated an example of this in web browser support for cookies. 
Most browsers do not, by default, indicate when a site sets a cookie or what 
information is disclosed through its use. The prevalence of third-party cookies and 
web bugs (tiny web page images that facilitate tracking) exacerbates users’ ignorance 
of who is observing their browsing activities. Beckwith (2003) yet again illustrated 
this in the locator badges which generally do not inform their wearers about who is 
locating them. 
 
5.2.2 Proposed Solution: Scope of Actual Disclosure of Information 
 
Mobile phone payment systems should be designed in such a way that coarse 
information are required from end users when requesting for sensitive information 
such as passwords and memorable information, for instance it could just require some 
random characters from the memorable information instead of the entire word, when 
complete information such as credit card number are required users should only be 
allowed to enter it using their phone keypad instead of reading it out, assuming they 
are not alone. Friedman et al’s (2002) redesign of cookie management reveals what 
information is disclosed to whom. They extended the Mozilla web browser to provide 
prominent visual feedback about the real-time placement and characteristics of 
cookies, thereby showing users what information is being disclosed to what web sites 
(Friedman et al., 2002).  
 
 
 
 
 5.3 Concern TOP: Top Level Control Mechanism 
 
Designers should offer an obvious, top-level mechanism for halting and resuming the 
transmission of information in ubiquitous systems. Users are accustomed to turning a 
device off when they want its operation to stop. Often a single power button or exit 
button will do the trick. Beyond binary control, a simple ordinal control may also be 
appropriate in some cases (such as audio devices’ volume and mute controls). In the 
general case, users can become remarkably adept at wielding coarse grained controls 
to yield nuanced results (e.g., driving a car requires use of a wheel, a stick, and two or 
three pedals, but their manipulation yields tremendous results). Plus, coarse-grained 
controls often reflect their state, providing direct feedback and freeing the user from 
having to remember whether she set a preference properly. This helps users 
accommodate the controls and even co-opt them in ways the designer may not have 
intended. Examples specific to privacy include: setting a door ajar, covering up or 
repositioning cameras (Janke et. al, 2001), turning off a phone or using its invisible 
mode rather than navigating its privacy-related options, and removing a worn locator 
badge. While some fine-grained controls may be unavoidable, the flexibility they are 
intended to provide is often lost to their neglect, which is then compensated for by the 
nuanced manipulation of coarse-grained controls across devices, applications, and 
time. 
5.3.1 Research Evidence: Top Level Control Mechanism 
 
Most users take the “switch off” button on devices literally and when they intend 
achieve this through the easiest possible means they can. One of the interviewees 
asserted that: 
“Mainly  because  when  i  do  not  want  to  receive  calls,  I  do  not  want 
disturbance, I just switch it off. “  
Almost all users of ubiquitous devices use one form of top level switching mechanism 
such as mute, turn off and profiling functions on their ubiquitous devices  (all of the 
10 respondents to the interview demonstrated this fact in their responses). This 
reflects the user’s intension to completely disable their devices through the switch off 
button, however this might not be the situation in some cases as to whereby the switch 
off button is not been placed somewhere it can be quickly accessed or some devices 
that just do not switch off completely even when its visual display has been turned 
 
 off. Similarly, most web browsers still bury their privacy controls under two or three 
layers of configuration panels (Felten et. al, 2001). While excessive configuration 
may itself be a problem, the issue here is that there is typically no top-level control for 
switching between one’s normal cookie policy and a “block all cookies” policy.  
In another similar research, wearable locator-badges like those described in (Harper 
et. al, 1992) and (Beckwith, 2003) do not have power buttons. One could remove the 
badge and leave it somewhere else, but simply turning it off would at times be more 
practical or preferable.  
 
5.3.2 Proposed Solution: Top Level Control Mechanism 
Systems that expose simple, obvious ways of halting and resuming disclosure include 
easily coverable cameras (Sellen and Bellotti, 1993), mobile phones with obvious 
power buttons, instant messaging systems with invisible modes and stealth controls 
(Abowd et. al, 2001). Designers should learn to adopt obvious top level controls and 
buttons such as these ones at locations that are easy to find in the ubiquitous device. 
 
5.4 Concern IP: Integration of Existing Practice 
Designers should be aware of inhibiting existing social practice. People manage 
privacy through a range of established, often nuanced, practices. While early designs 
might lack elegant support for emergent practices—since, obviously, substantive 
practice cannot evolve around a system until after deployment—designers can at least 
take care to avoid inhibiting established ones. This is effectively a call to employ 
privacy design patterns. In particular, it is important to emphasize the broad 
applicability of plausible deniability (whereby the potential observer cannot determine 
whether a lack of disclosure was intentional) (Woodruff and Aoki, 2003; Nardi et al., 
2000) and disclosing ambiguous information (e.g., pseudonyms, imprecise location).  
 
These common, broadly applicable techniques allow people to finesse disclosure 
through technical systems to achieve nuanced social ends. Systems that rigidly 
contradict meta-practices like plausible deniability and ambiguous disclosure may 
encounter significant resistance during deployment (Suchman, 1997). Technical 
systems are notoriously awkward at supporting social nuance (Ackerman, 2004). 
Interestingly, however, systems that survive long enough in the field often contribute 
 
 to the emergence of new practice even if they suffer from socially awkward design in 
the first place (e.g., see [Wakeford et. al, 2001, Boyd, 2004]). In other words, 
emergent nuance happens. But being intrinsically difficult to predict, seed, and design 
for, it generally doesn’t happen as optimally as we might like it to. Designers will 
continue to struggle to support these emergent practices, but by identifying existing 
genres of disclosure and successful privacy design patterns, they can at least help 
users transfer established skills to new technologies and domains. 
 
5.4.1 Research Evidence: Integration of Existing Practice 
 
Some mobile phone users simply do not bother about chosen a secured personal 
identification number (PIN) for their voicemails, simply because they dim the process 
not too suitable for their usage, as it reflects a huge learning curve for the users. One 
of the responders gave reason for not using the PIN service as: 
 
“I do not know how to use it and I would not like to be a victim of its usage.”  
 
About 80% of ubiquitous device users will not interact with distinctively new features 
that have not been effectively bonded to the existing operational culture they are used 
to  (8 out of the 10 respondents to the interview demonstrated their unwillingness to 
protect their voicemails due to insufficient understanding of how the protection 
system functions, in their responses). Some researchers envision context-aware 
mobile phones that disclose the user’s activity to the caller to help explain why their 
call was not answered (Wong et. al, 2003). However, this prohibits users from 
exploiting plausible deniability. There can be value in keeping the caller ignorant of 
the reason for not answering. Location-tracking systems like those described by 
Newman et. Al. (1992) and Beckwith (2003) constrain users’ ability to incorporate 
ambiguity into their location disclosures. Users can only convey their concise location 
or—when permitted—nothing at all. 
5.4.2 Proposed Solution: Integration of Existing Practice 
 
Mobile phones, push-to-talk phones (Aoki and Woodruff, 2003), and instant 
messaging systems (Bradner et. al, 2000) let users exploit plausible deniability by not 
 
 responding to hails and not having to explain why. Although privacy on the web is a 
common concern, a basic function of HTML allows users to practice ambiguous 
disclosure. Forms that let users enter false data facilitate anonymous account creation 
and service provision.  
 
5.5 Concern CC: Complexity of Configuration 
 
Designs should not require excessive configuration to create and maintain privacy. 
They should enable users to practice privacy management as a natural consequence of 
their ordinary use of the system. Palen and Dourish (2003) argued that standardising 
on explicit parameters and requiring people to live by them simply does not work, and 
yet this is often what information technology requires… Instead, a fine and shifting 
line between privacy and publicity exists, and is dependent on social context, 
intention, and the fine-grained coordination between action and the disclosure of that 
action”. But because configuration has become a universal user interface design 
pattern, many systems fall for this configuration flaw. Configured privacy breaks 
down for at least two reasons.  
 
First, in real settings users manage privacy semi-intuitively; they do not spell out their 
privacy needs in an auxiliary, focused effort (Whitten and Tygar, 1999). 
Configuration imposes an awkward requirement on users, one they will often forsake 
in favour of default settings (Adams, 2000; Beckwith, 2003). If users are to manage 
their privacy at all, it needs to be done in an intuitive fashion, as a predictable 
outcome of their situated actions involving the system. People generally do not set out 
to explicitly protect their privacy. Rather, they participate in some activity, with 
privacy regulation being an embedded component of that activity. Designs should 
take care not to extract the privacy regulation process from the activity within which it 
is normally conducted. 
 
5.5.1 Research Evidence: Integration of Existing Practice 
Some mobile ubiquitous devices provide frustrating processes in the configuration of 
privacy and this affects and discourages users to use them.  About 70% of ubiquitous 
device users will not check their emails or buy items from the internet on their mobile 
devices because of the complexity of the interaction interface made available for this 
 
 process.  (7 out of the 10 respondents to the interview demonstrated their 
unwillingness to protect their voicemails due to insufficient understanding of how the 
protection system functions, in their responses). One of the responses was quoted 
thus: 
“I do not know how to use it and I would not like to be a victim of its usage.”  
 
5.5.2 Proposed Solution: Complexity of Configuration 
 
When someone is aware of a camera’s presence, they tend to adjust their behaviour to 
present alignment with the perceived expectations of their ostensible observers 
(Foucault, 1977). They do not step outside to reconfigure their representation. They 
simply act, albeit with “appropriate” intuition and/or intention. Cadiz and Gupta 
(2001) proposed a smart card that one could hand to a receptionist to grant him 
limited access to one’s calendar to schedule an appointment; he would hand it back 
right afterwards without much hassle of searches and configuration and no one would 
have to fumble with setting permissions (Cadiz and Gupta, 2001). Similar practices 
were proposed by Cadiz and Gupta (2001) above could be integrated into the design 
of new ubiquitous systems to simplify the processes involved in carrying out 
operations on ubiquitous systems. Two identified categories of concern are those that 
primarily affect users’ understanding of a system’s privacy implications and those that 
primarily affect their ability to conduct meaningful action through the system. 
 
 
6.0 Conclusion 
This paper reports on a preliminary study that uncovers privacy concerns associated 
with everyday digital interaction with recognised devices (termed Ubiquitous devices 
as they play an active part in our everyday lives).  The focus on devices used in our 
everyday lives allows the research to investigate privacy in a ubiquitous world, 
moving the lens from a single device to everyday activities on a range of devices.  Ten 
interviews are carried out and the transcribed data is analysed using grounded theory 
to code the responses into a number of categories.  The categories are brought 
together (with literature) to form a design framework that aims to support the designer 
of ubiquitous applications or ubiquitous information systems. Two major categories 
 
 are found – those that affect user understanding of a system’s privacy implications 
and those that primarily affect their ability to conduct meaningful action through the 
system. 
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